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In the Supreme Court 
of the State of Utah 
DORIS E. WELLS, 
Plaintiff-Respondent, 
vs. No. 8015 
RAY A. WELLS, 
Defendant-Appellant. 
DEFENDANT-APPELLANT'S BRIEF 
NATURE OF THE CASE 
" ... Only occasionally have superior minds closely 
considered the principals involved and undertaken to 
define, with care, the boundaries of the jurisdiction 
of courts and the circumstances under which their juris-
diction will and will not attach." 
(14 Am fur, Courts, #159) 
This appeal primarily involves two legal 1ssues which 
apparently have not been ruled upon by the Supreme Court 
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of the State of Utah. The first issue relates to the jurisdiction 
of the District Courts of this state in divorce actions; the second 
issue involves an interpretation of Rule 15(b) and .(d), Utah 
Rules of Civil Procedure, concerning the power of a court 
to permit plaintiff -respondent (the losing party), after trial 
and judgment, to file and to recover judgment upon amended 
and supplemental pleadings which set forth an entirely new 
theory of recovery inconsistent with, and repudiated by, all 
prior pleadings of that party. 
The lawsuit involved in this appeal was initially· brought 
by the respondent, hereinafter designated as the plaintiff, 
against this appellant, hereinafter designated as the defendant, 
upon a complaint containing two separate counts asking for 
support and alimony for the plaintiff and the minor child of 
the parties. The jurisdictional issue involved is primarily one 
of whether or not a non-resident divorced woman, without 
any Utah residency or domiciliary background, can enter the 
courts of Utah for the purpose of securing alimony and support 
for herself and the minor child of the parties from a former 
husband who secured a divorce from her in a Nevada proceed-
ing 2¥2 years prior thereto, she assuming the Nevada decree 
to be valid as to dissolving the marital status, but claiming 
the right to secure alimony and support in an "independent" 
action. 
This defendant contends that the District Courts of Utah 
do not have jurisdiction over the subject matter of such actions. 
This defendant further maintains that the plaintiff has followed 
an improper procedure throughout the action and must resort 
to the proper procedures provided by law for seeking what-
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ever relief she is entitled to so that he at the same time may be 
accorded adequate representation in the matter. 
The second chief issue relates to the limits of discretion 
which our District Courts can exercise under Rule 15 (b) and 
(d) of Utah Rules of Civil Procedure in permitting a plaintiff 
who has brought an action to trial on a substituted theory-
raised by a "Reply"-that the Nevada decree of divorce secured 
by this defendant was null and void by reason of being fraudu-
lently obtained and lacking jurisdictional requirements, and 
who failed to prevail on such theory, to thereupon, after trial, 
and in the absence of any evidence in support thereof, petition 
the court to allow her, after previously unequivocally main-
taining the applicable portion of the Nevada divorce decree 
to be invalid, to set up that very provision of the Nevada 
decree as a new cause of action in an "Amended and Supple-
mental" pleading, and to recover judgment against this defend-
ant upon such amended pleadings on a subsequent Motion for 
Judgment on the Pleadings. 
FACTS OF THE CASE 
Plaintiff is a resident of the State of New York. This 
defendant was a resident of the State of Utah when this action 
was commenced. Plaintiff and defendant intermarried at 
Watertown, New York, on April 4, 1943, and had a daughter 
born as issue of said marriage, now of the age of approximately 
nine years. 
On October 6, 1949, this defendant, after establishing 
residence in the State of Nevada, secured a decree of divorce 
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from the plaintiff, she having been personally served with 
summons and a copy of the complaint by constructive service 
in the State of New York. She did not appear in or contest 
the proceedings nor did she appeal from the same. The decree 
entered in the Nevada court did not provide alimony for the 
plaintiff, but did provide the sum of $35.00 per month as child 
support for the minor child of the parties. Shortly after secur-
ing the decree, this defendant remarried, moved to Utah, and 
became a resident of this state. 
On or about June 19, 1952, plaintiff filed an action in the 
Third District Court of Utah, seeking relief on two separate 
counts. The first count assumed the Nevada decree to be valid 
insofar as it dissolved the marital status between the parties, 
but denied its validity as to the right of the plaintiff to receive 
alimony for herself and support money for the minor child 
(R. 2). The complaint prayed that the court fix and determine 
the amount of alimony to be paid to plaintiff and the amount 
of support money to be paid to the plaintiff for the minor child 
of the parties notwithstanding any provision of the Nevada 
decree (R. 3). 
The complaint was composed of two counts ("causes of 
action") substantially as follows: 
COUNT I. To secure child support and alimony for 
herself in an "independent" action, separate and apart 
·from seeking an actual divorce, as to the future. 
COUNT II. To secu~e reimbursement for pas/ 
amounts expended for child suppor~ and alimony for 
herself from October 16, 1948, unttl the time of the 
filing of the complaint. 
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In addition, an Order to Show Cause, attached thereto, 
asked for temporary support and alimony and temporary at-
torney's fees pending the litigation. However, the relief sought 
by this and two similar subsequent motions raised by plaintiff 
(one of which asked for travel expenses for plaintiff from 
New York to Utah for the purpose of appearing at the trial) 
were denied by District Judges Martin M. Larson (R. 4) and 
David T. Lewis (R. 40) for the reason that no marital status 
existed upon which such orders could be made. 
Defendant thereupon (by Amended Answer-R. 21) 
answered the complaint (as amended by interlineation (R. 2) 
to delete the plaintiff's claim for past amounts allegedly owing 
for her own support) and admitted that the Nevada decree 
was not binding on the subject of child support, but asserted 
that it was binding upon the plaintiff's right to receive alimony. 
In addition, defendant affirmatively alleged that the parties 
had entered into an agreement prior to securing the Nevada 
divorce whereby the plaintiff had agreed not to ask for support 
money for herself or the minor child of the parties upon the 
condition that defendant would not molest the child nor ask 
for its custody, and alleged that he had complied with the 
agreement in all particulars. The foregoing defense was raised 
only as to the second cause of action which asked for past dtte 
amounts expended for child support up to the commencement 
of this action. This defense was permitted to stand, against 
plaintiff's objection, by Judge Baker and was also acknowledged 
by Judge VanCott (see infra). 
This defendant admitted that the minor child could recover 
on its own behalf in the event of futu1'e need, notwithstanding 
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any agreement between the parties, but further affirmatively 
alleged that child support in the past haa not been contributed 
by the plaintiff, but had been contributed by other persons. 
Defendant also took the position (R. 8) that the Third 
District Court had no jurisdiction over the subject matter of 
the action and could not grant the relief prayed for. 
After this defendant had filed his Amended Answer, 
plaintiff was permitted, over the objection of defendant raised 
before Judge Baker by a Motion to Strike and Dismiss, to file 
a Reply (R. 19) in the action. The Reply asserted in substance 
that the Nevada decree was null and void. 
On April 7, 1953, after a "trial" in the above case, at 
which neither the plaintiff nor any witnesses on her behalf 
appeared, and after subsequently permitting plaintiff to file 
an Amended and Supplemental Complaint (R. 44) after she 
failed to prevail in the trial of the action, Judge Ray Van Cott 
granted judgment to the plaintiff (R. 103) on the Amended 
and Supplemental Complaint. This was based, in part, upon 
a finding of fact (R. 101) to the effect that the Nevada decree 
was valid and subsisting in all respects. As indicated, this 
judgment was based upon the Amended and Supplemental 
Complaint filed by the plaintiff after the adverse ruling of 
Judge Van Cott after a trial which was based on the Complaint 
and the Reply filed in the original action. 
Plaintiff was given a money judgment for $1,435.00 
accumulated child support under the Nevada decree and 
$200.00 attorney fees (the matter of attor~y· s fees being raised 
only by the Amended and Supplemental Complaint), and 
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defendant was ordered to make payment of the sum of $35.00 
per month, as per the Nevada decree which was established 
as a decree of the Third District Court, on and after April 1., 
1953. 
To simplify the events which have taken place in the past 
year in this case, suffice it to say that many objections, arguments 
and motions were made before various judges of the Third 
Judicial District, the total of which consume more than three 
pages of docket entries. Since many of them are only incidentally 
material to the issues raised on this appeal, the record has been 
abbreviated as much as possible for the benefit of this court. 
NOTE: Wherever italicized material appears in any text 
or quoted provision in this brief, the same has been added. 
STATEMENT OF POINTS 
Defendant submits the following points as reasons for 
seeking a reversal of the judgment of the lower court: 
I. The Third District Court had no jurisdiction over 
the subject matter of the complaint to which the relief 
prayed for was related. 
II. Even if the court had jurisdiction, it erred in per-
miting the filing of the Amended and Supplemental 
Complaint after trial. 
III. Even if the court had jurisdiction and if it prop-
erly allowed the filing of amended and supplemental 
pleadings, it erred in granting judgment on the amended 
and supplemental pleadings. 
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ARGUMENT 
(I) 
The Third District Court had no jurisdiction over thE 
subject matter of the complaint to which the relief prayed fot 
was related. 
The two counts of plaintiff's complaint set forth purported 
causes of action asking for support and alimony for the plaintiff 
and the minor child of the two parties. In so doing, ~e plaintifl 
assumed that the Nevada decree of divorce was valid only in· 
sofar as it dissolved the marital relationship, but contended 
that she should have the right to bring an "independent" action 
for the purpose of securing alimony for herself and support 
for the minor child of the parties without asking for a divorce. 
As authority for bringing such an action, the Utah case 
of Hutton vs. Dodge, 58 Utah 228, 198 Pac. 165, is cited. In 
that case the wife--a resident of Utah-brought a Utah divorce 
proceeding. Personal service of the husband in Utah could not 
be effected. Thereupon, she was granted a divorce based upon 
constructive service of process, but the decree specifically left 
open the matter of alimony until the defendant could be per· 
sonally served in Utah. In ruling on the case, our court felt 
that the husband could not thereafter be brought before the 
court by service of a motion since it would not give jurisdiction 
of the person, but stated that a separate independent action 
would lie 
..... in a case of this kind, where jurisdiction of the 
defendant is afterwards seasonably obtained and the 
rights of third parties have not intervened . " 
10 
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Note: This defendant remarried soon after the Ne-
vada decree was issued, and came to Utah where he 
resided for more than 21/z years before any demand was 
made upon him by his former wife. She, at all times, 
was aware of his whereabouts (R. 88 and 72). 
Sec. 30-3-5, Utah Code Annotated, 1953. Disposition of Prop-
erty and Children. 
rrw hen a decree of divorce is made the court may 
make such orders in relation to the children, property 
and parties, and the maintenance of parties and chil-
dren, as may be equitable; ... Such subsequent changes 
or new orders may be made by the Court with respect 
to the disposal of the children or the distribution of the 
property as shall be reasonable and proper." 
The foregoing statute clearly provides that there must 
at least be an antecedent Utah divorce proceeding before the 
rule of Hutton vs. Dodge)s to apply. Hutton vs. Dodge is an 
exception to the general rule that alimony and support can 
only be granted as an incident to a divorce proceeding. How-
ever, the courts, writers and annotators have been careful to 
limit it to situations where 
(a) the wife was the moving party originally; and 
(b) Where the original divorce proceeding was com-
menced in the same state. 
See 42 ALR 1386-7: 
"II. Divorce decreein same state or country. 
A. Procured by wife." 
(with discussion of the case of Hutton vs. Dodge) 
In connection with the foregoing ALR citation, one other 
case in addition to Hutton vs." Dodge was cited as an exception 
11 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
to the general rule. That case involved a decision of the court 
of Massachusetts. However, upon examining and reading the 
Massachusetts case, it can be seen that the exception in that 
situation was provided by statute and not by court decision 
alone. Hutton vs. Dodge seems to be about the only case where 
the foregoing limited exception has been superimposed upon 
statutory law by court decision. It seems clear, however, that 
an application of the rule set forth in the case of Hutton vs. 
Dodge was never intended to apply to non-residents entering 
our courts. 
Hutton vs. Dodge is based upon the premise that the wife, 
being the moving party, never had the opportunity of having 
her "day in court." It is interesting to note that had the plaintiff 
in this action sought to contest the Nevada decree (wherein 
she was defendant), or otherwise make any appearances in such 
action, the courts of Nevada would have furnished her with 
travel expenses (which she unsuccessfully sought to secure 
in this Utah proceeding) to take her to Nevada from New 
York. This rule was recognized in the Nevada case of Ormsley 
vs. District Court, 51 Utah J.39, 276 Pac. 14. 
Now when we attempt to apply the rule of Hutton vs. 
Dodge to a non-resident woman entering our courts we meet 
this problem: By what authority do our courts acquire juris-
diction to entertain the action? 
This defendant asserts that our courts lack jurisdiction of 
the subject matter of such an action. 
"There was no common law right of divorce. 
Divorce is purely a matter of statute." 
12 
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]elme z·s. ]elme, 98 NE 2d 401, 22 ALR 1300, 155 
Ohio St. 226. 
Divorce was not recognized at common law; nor was 
alimony. Alimony must find its basis in a divorce action and 
is dependent upon an existing marriage. In this connection 
Utah has provided for "alimony" after marriage as an incident 
of a divorce proceeding. 'See Title 30, Chapters 3 and 4, Utah 
Code Anno., 1953. It is submitted that there is no provision 
in our codes nor any judicial decision which allows a non-
resident woman to enter our courts to determine an allowance 
of alimony and support for herself or for a child, in the manner 
here sought, after a divorce decree of another state terminates 
the marital status. 
Counsel for plaintiff wife will undoubtedly refer this 
court to several decisions wherein separate alimony actions 
after divorce have been permitted, but every single case is justi-
fied only by reason of the statutory law of that particular state 
permitting an alimony action separate and apart from seeking 
a divorce. Approximately six jurisdictions have statutes with 
provisions more or less similar to that of Ohio, but Utah has 
no such statute: 
Page's Ohio Gen. Code Anno. 
Section 11980 ... rrExcept in an action for alimony 
alone, plaintiff must have been a resident of the state 
at least one year ... !he court shall hear and determine 
the case whether the marriage took place, or the divorce 
occttrred, within or without the state." 
Note: Wick vs. Wick, 58 Ohio App. 72, 15 NE 2d 780, 
admits that Ohio is among a minority of jurisdictions 
permitting separate alimony actions as provided by the 
foregoing statute. 
13 
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Statutes of Oklahoma: 
Section 1284. Alimony without Divorce. 
"The wife or husband may obtain alimony from the 
other without a divorce, in an action brought for that 
purpose in the District Court, for any of the causes for 
which a divorce may be granted." 
Similar statutes are found in Kentucky, Kansas, Florida, 
Georgia and a very few other states. 
Our statutes are not sufficiently broad to permit plaintiff 
to enter our courts, nor do they give our courts jurisdiction 
to entertain the subject matter of the action or to give the 
relief originally sought. A careful persual of the provisions 
of Chapter 3 of Title 30 of our Code will reveal that all 
support provisions for both wife and child come under the 
heading of "Divorce". 
This contention is very clearly brought out in 27 CJS 1278 
(which incidentally is the same rule adopted by the Restate· 
ment of Conflict of Laws in Sec. 45 7 and 463, leaving the matter 
up to the legislature): 
rrunder a statute so providing, a court may award 
alimony after a divorce has been granted outside the 
state. The purpose of such a statute is to enlarge the 
jurisdiction of the court and empower it to prevent, so 
far as possible, the state from being a haven for former 
husbands immigrating to it to avoid alimony obliga· 
tions. While, in a suit under such a statute, allegations 
as to other litigations and awards of alimony under the 
divorce decree are impertinent and improper ... the 
statute is permissive, rather than. mandatory . . . In 
the absence of statutory authortty1 a suit whether 
commenced before or after the rendition of' a foreign 
14 
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decree, to obtain an award of alimony as distinguished 
from a suit to enforce a foreign decree from alimony 
or to correct arrears thereunder, may not be maintained 
after the court of another jurisdiction has granted a 
divorce with or without alimony . . . " 
The Maryland court (and there are many other decisions 
to the same effect) has said in the case of Staub vs. Staub, 
183 A. 610: 
"We are unable to conclude that the right to maintain 
a proceeding for alimony may survive the dissolution 
of the marriage relation, since alimony is founded 
upon the common law obligation of a husband to sup-
port his wife, which, in the absence of some saving 
statute, must necessarily end by the passage of a decree 
effectively dissolving the marriage tie, and it seems to 
us that the cases in other jurisdictions adopting this 
view are justified by justice and reason." 
The New Jersey court, 10 N. ]. Eq. 138, in ruling upon 
a New Jersey statute similar to the statutes of Utah and Cali-
fornia, stated that the jurisdiction of the courts of equity in 
cases of divorce and alimony are prescribed by statute authoriz-
ing the courts to render decrees for maintenance and alimony 
when a divorce is decreed, and another providing that it shall 
be lawful for the court to order alimony without connecting 
such order with a decree for divorce, where the husband has, 
without justifiable cause, abandoned his wife or separated him-
self from her, and refuses or neglects to maintain or provide 
for her. The court held that the court of equity in New Jersey 
had no jurisdiction to decree alimony alone, except in cases 
expressly authorized by statute. 
15 
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It is interesting to note that in 1938 New Jersey, by legis 
lative action, provided that actions for alimony could be main 
tained separate and apart from divorce actions, thus alterin~ 
the foregoing court ruling based upon prior statutory law. 
The Restatement of Conflict of Laws has left the matteJ 
of alimony entirely to the legislature: 
Section 457. 
"A state has legislative jurisdiction to impose upon 
one person a duty to support another person if, (b) the 
person to support is domiciled within the state although 
the person to be supported is not subject to the juris· 
diction of the state . . . " 
Section 463. 
"Alimony can, in its discretion, be granted by a 
court under the law of its own state . . . " 
In the case of Bowman vs. Worthington, 24 Ark. 522, 
the court indicated, in interpreting statutes similar to those 
of Utah, that alimony is an incident to divorce and it may be 
allowed, under the phraseology of the Arkansas statute, only 
as an incident of divorce and in connection with the divorce. 
This defendant further maintains that plaintiff must, 
even if this court were to permit her to maintain an independent 
action, plead the required residency for three months as re· 
quired in divorce actions. This point was not involved in 
Hutton vs. Dodge, since the wife had previously been a residenl 
of Utah when the divorce proceeding commenced, but the courl 
answered the issue in unequivocal terms: 
16 
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"She could not follow her husband into another state 
and obtain relief for she would first have to establish 
a residence there before she could sue." 
Plaintiff may contend that the issue of a three-month 
residency period is a mere formality in pleading the rr cause 
of action" and that it is not a jurisdictional requirement. In 
answer to this contention the Utah case of Weiss vs. Weiss 
( 1947), 111 Utah 353, 179 Pac. 2d 1005, has taken a definite 
stand: 
"If it (the Court) finds that there was no such resi-
dence, it has no power to further act as to the marriage 
contract; and if it acts in such regard, it exceeds its 
authority." 
"As the plaintiff did not have the residence required 
by the statute the district court did not obtain juris-
diction of the status of marriage in this case and any 
judgment or order made in reference thereto is of no 
effect." 
In the second count of her complaint plaintiff attempted 
to set forth a claim for reimbursement to hersel~ for past 
amounts spent for herself and the minor child. In answer to 
the jurisdictional matter involved in such a claim, the very 
recent California case of Dimon vs. Dimon (May 27, 1952-
California District Court of Appeals) 244 Pac. 2d 972 at 978 
answers the point raised in plaintiff's second count: 
"Respondent has not cited any case in which it was 
held that an action for support of children could be 
maintained under such circumstances and we have 
found none. Here the action was not brought by the 
minor children, nor by the mother as their guardian. 
17 
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The action was brought by the mother mainly .to re-
imburse herself for moneys which she had patd out 
in the support of the minors. No reason .has been ad-
vanced why there should be distinction ( m the matter 
of the court's jurisdiction) between a recovery for the 
wife's own support and a reimbursement of moneys 
paid for the children.'' 
This writer refers the court to the case of Dimon vs. 
Dimon as a very clear analysis of the general problem involved 
in this entire action. In fact, the Dimon case cites the Utah 
case of Hutton vs. Dodge as an exception to the general rule 
against allowing a wife to bring a subsequent alimony action 
and, in so doing, gives it the same limited scope that the anno-
tators of ALR have given it. No case can be found which in-
terprets the exception of Hutton vs. Dodge to be extended 
to non-residents entering our courts. To so extend the excep-
tion would be for the courts to usurp the functions of the 
legislature. 
In a separate concurring optruon at page 979 Justice 
Goodell quoted five sections of the California Civil Code, 
basically similar to our Utah Code sections referring to divorce, 
and stated: 
"The language of the 5 sections just emphasized 
shows a consistent and studied legislative purpose to 
confine and limit the powers of the court to the period 
of time .when actions for ~ivorce, .annulment and sepa-
rate mamtenance are pendmg, which of course includes 
time on appeal, 1049, Code Civ. Proc., and such further 
time (e.g., during minority, or by a reservation in a 
decree) ~s ~ay be properly within the scope of the 
same action. 
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" ... In the pending case the wife, after her Con-
necticut divorce had become final, sought and obtained, 
in a new independent action with no underlying Cali-
fornia antecedents an alimony order in this state of 
which she was not a resident. It is difficult to see how 
this could be accomplished." 
It is interesting to note that on appeal to the California 
Supreme Court, the case of Dimon vs. Dimon was affirmed in 
a lengthy decision. It can be found at 254 Pac. 2d 528 and was 
decided on April 25, 1953. It is also interesting to note that 
the subject of child support was thoroughly discussed. In this 
connection, California, like Utah, provides that child support 
and alimony are proper incidents of divorce decree only by 
virtue of statute. However, California now has a special statu-
tory law allowing the mother to bring an action in her own 
name on behalf of the child, separate and apart from a divorce 
action. This is found in Civil Code 13 7.1 : 
137.1 Action for support, maintenance and education 
of children. "When a father or mother has the duty to 
provide for the support, maintenance and education of 
the children of the father and mother and wilfully fails 
to provide for such support, maintenance and education, 
the father or mother, as the case may be, or any child 
by its guardian ad litem, may maintain an action in 
the superior court against the mother or father, or 
both, as the case may be, for the support, maintenance 
and education of said children." 
Similarly, the State of New York has provided a special 
law by Section 13 7, subdivision 1 of the Domestic Relations 
Court of the City of New York: 
"If the marriage relationship shall have been termi-
nated by final decree of the Supreme Court of the State 
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of New York or by a judgment of any other court of 
competent jurisdiction, when valid in the State of New 
York, a petition may be filed for an order for support 
made or enforced in the family court only for the benefit 
of a child of such marriage." 
From the foregoing statutes (of which Utah has no similar 
provision) the only way that a mother can sue in her name after 
divorce, and in the manner contemplated by the two counts 
of plaintiff's original complaint, is by virtue of a special 
statute. In the absence of. such a statute, as indicated in the 
Dimon case, plaintiff would have to bring her action in Utah 
on behalf of the child only-and not for herself-either as 
guardian ad litem of the child or by using the Uniform Re-
ciprocal Enforcement of Support Act provisions. This matter 
will be again referred to at a later point. 
It is interesting to note that when Dimon vs. Dimon was 
affirmed on appeal, Justice Traynor, the only justice who dis-
sented in part (and who will undoubtedly be quoted by plain-
tiff), acknowledged that a state such as California (or Utah) 
should not entertain an action of the type here brought if 
the state of the matrimonial domicile (New York) would not 
have entertained such an action ( 254 Pac. 2d 528 at 541): 
"A former wife, however, would not be permitted 
to bring an action in California for support following 
an ex parte decree, i.f a similar action would not be 
entertained by courts of the state where she was domi-
ciled. at the time of the decree ..... the full faith and 
credtt clause would compel Cahfornra to give the same 
e~ect to the deere~ and hold that the decree not only 
drssolved the marnage status but terminated the wife's 
right to support ... If the husband obtained the decree 
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in another state and under the law of the state of the 
wife's domicile her right to support was lost when the 
marriage status terminated, she would likewise be not 
allowed, by migrating to another state, to revive a 
right that had expired." 
Now let us look at the New York cases since plaintiff 
is and was a resident of the State of New York. In a case of 
' 
this kind, New York would not have entertained the claim 
for alimony and child support set forth in plaintiff's com-
plaint. In the case of Adler vs. Adler (1948) 192 Misc. 953-, 81 
NYS 2d 797, the New York court pointed out that the basis 
for an alimony action is the existence of a conventional marital 
relationship, and that no action for support in favor of the 
wife would lie where the relationship had been severed by a 
decree of a court having competent jurisdiction. 
In the case of Harris vs. Harris (1952) 979 App Div. 
542, 110 NYS 2d 824, the husband secured an Illinois divorce, 
based upon constructive service against the non-resident wife. 
It was held that the validity of the foreign decree barred the 
wife from claiming temporary alimony since the foreign decree 
destroyed the very ground upon which the wife's complaint 
necessarily rested. Other New York cases in point and to 
the same effect are Taffel vs. Taffel ( 1943) 181 Misc. 259, 
43 NYS 2d ~77, Standish vs. Standish ( 1943) 179 Misc. 
564, 40 NYS 2d 538, and Davies vs. Davies (1946) 187 Misc. 
313, 62 NYS 2d 790. 
After the filing of this defendant's Amended Answer, the 
plaintiff interjected and substituted an entirely new cause of 
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action in place of her original counts by means of a pleadin~ 
designated as a "Reply" (R. 19). Over the objections of thi~ 
defendant raised on a Motion to Strike and Dismiss, Judge 
Baker permitted the Reply to stand. It is submitted that the 
court's ruling was clearly erroneous, as will hereinafter appear 
The sum and substance ~f the Reply, as claimed by counsel 
for plaintiff in objecting to the granting of an Intermediatf 
Appeal by this Court (the file of which is in the office of thf 
Clerk of the Utah Supreme Court and contains the followin~ 
quoted statement), was that the wife was setting up a new 
and substituted cause of action on the theory of separate main. 
tenance: 
" ... That by this Complaint and reply, the wife 
sets up a cause of action for her own support, as the 
legal wife of the husband, and for the support of the 
minor child of these parties . . . " 
From the foregoing statement, it appears that the plaintiff 
abandoned the first two counts of the complaint and substituted 
an entirely new cause of action, the new "cause of action" 
being based on the assumption that the Nevada decree was 
totally null and void, that she was still the legally married 
wife of the defendant and that her theory of recovery was 
separate maintenance. In short, she did a flip-flop. 
Under Rule 7 (a) of Utah Rules of Civil Procedure: 
this Reply should never have been allowed to be introduced 
The defendant maintains that he has been denied due proces~ 
of law under the Constitutions of the State of Utah and oJ 
the United States in that he is not granted, under Rules 7 (a) 
and 12 (a), an opportunity to appear and defend against th~ 
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allegations of a "Reply" which attempts to introduce a new 
cause of action, particularly where he may have affirmative 
matter to plead in defense thereto. 
If the Court will examine the "Reply" (R. 19) the fol-
lowing facts will be noted: 
( 1) It sets forth matter entirely contradictory to that 
raised in the complaint, and adopts a new theory; 
( 2) In and of itself it does not set forth any cause of 
action; 
( 3) When viewed in connection with the complaint, 
it still fails to supply the necessary ingredients 
to plead a cause of action for separate mainten-
ance or any other claim; 
( 4) If it seeks to set aside the Nevada decree of 
divorce, it certainly does not ask for such relief, 
nor does it pray for any relief; and 
( 5) If it conceivably sets forth a cause of action for 
separate maintenance, it must relate back to the 
original complaint. In so doing, the plaintiff 
pleads herself out of court because the complaint 
alleges that there exists a separate agreement 
(R. 1). 
6 ALR p. 75 citing cases) : 
"Generally a separation agreement between husband 
and wife which is not inequitable is a defense to the 
wife's action or suit for separate maintenance." 
This writer frankly admits that he was, and is, in a 
quandry as to just what plaintiff was attempting to do or plead 
by her Reply. Although Judge Baker permitted the Reply to 
stand and even granted a motion permitting travel expense 
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money from New York based upon such Reply (which Judge 
Lewis later set aside on contempt proceedings), it was not en-
tirely clear until after written briefs had been submitted during 
certain phases of the case and until the actual "trial" of the 
case, that plaintiff had thoroughly and completely reversed 
her theory of action. This writer attempted to secure a state-
ment from plaintiff's counsel as to just what he was attempting 
to do by means of this Reply, but counsel would neither commit 
himself nor clarify his stand. 
If plaintiff has succeeded in raising a new cause of action 
by her "Reply," this writer will seriously consider re-learning 
all of the pleading which he has ever known. Without citing 
a large number of cases, the writer will merely refer to standard 
legal texts: 
41 AM JUR, PLEADING: 
SEC. 177. FORM, CONTENTS, AND SUFFICI-
ENCY -"The replication or reply should not materially 
depart from the plaintiff's initial pleading, nor reassign 
or repeat the allegations contained therein, for it is no 
part of the office of a reply to allege matters which 
are necessarily a part of the cause of action and which 
must be sustained by the plaintiff's proof in opening 
... The replication or reply should relate back to the 
plaintiff's initial pleading and re-enforce the cause of 
action therein pleaded . . . " 
SEC. 179. OPERATION AND EFFECT -"It is 
clear. from the ~unction of a ~eply, as above explained, 
that zt cannot azd the complaz'!t by supplying omissions 
therein, broadening its scope, or adding new grounds 
of relief." . . . 
SEC. 185. WHAT CONSTITUTES-" . The 
plaintiff in his replication or reply will not be p~r~itted 
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to materially change the position taken by him in his 
initial pleading and bring forward a new and distinct 
cause of action from that declared on." 
SEC. 187. PARTICULAR APPLICATIONs-" ... 
there is a departure when the plaintiff's reply brings 
forward a distinct cause of action from that declared 
on in the complaint." 
In connection with the filing of a reply in the manner 
here attempted, our Utah court in the case of Combined 
Metals, Inc., vs. Bastian, 267 Pacific 1020, 71 Utah 535 at page 
5 54, has made the following declaration: 
"The reply thus was not only inconsistent within 
itself, but stated a different cause, on a different theory, 
on a different ground, and on a different contract from 
that stated in the complaint, and was a complete de-
parture therefrom. It, of course, is familiar doctrine 
that where allegations of a declaration are repugnant 
to and inconsistent with each other, they thereby 
neutralize each other and render the declaration bad 
The purpose of the foregoing argument relating to the 
Reply is pertinent to this appeal for the reason that if the two 
original counts in plaintiff's complaint failed because the court 
had no jurisdiction over the subject matter of the complaint, 
then the Reply, since it must relate back to the complaint and 
since its very validity and existence is based upon the complaint, 
should have also been stricken on jurisdictional grounds as 
well. The Reply, if it be_ conceded as the proper subject for a 
Reply, cannot cure the jurisdictional defect inherent in the 
Complaint. 
An examination of the transcript will show that the evi-
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dence which counsel for plaintiff introduced at the trial related 
wholly and solely to the attempt to set aside the Nevada 
divorce decree. In other words, all of the evidence that was 
introduced related to the cause of action allegedly set forth 
in the Reply. There was absolutely no evidence touching upon 
the two counts of the Complaint. As such, the evidence should 
have been inadmissible. And since the Complaint failed for lack 
of jurisdiction over the subject matter, no evidence should have 
been admitted relating to the Reply. 
(II) 
Ez'n if the court had jurisdiction, it erred in permitting the 
filing of the Amended and Supplemental Complaint after trial. 
After the trial of the case-at which neither the plaintiff 
nor any witnesses in her behalf appeared-and after attack-
ing the validity of the Nevada decree in all respects, including 
the portion relating to child support, plaintiff's attorney was 
permitted to file an Amended and Supplemental Complaint 
(R. 44). It was upon this pleading that judgment on the 
pleadings was given. As stated heretofore, despite attacking 
the Nevada decree in all respects in the Reply, the Amended 
and Supplemental Complaint was based entirely upon the 
Nevada decree and every provision therein contained. 
This defendant maintains that the court improperly al-
lowed plaintiff to file the Amended and Supplemental Com-
plaint. If we refer to Rule 15 (b) and (d) of Utah Rules of 
Civil Procedur~, we will find the following provisions for 
allowing the filing of amended and supplemental pleadings: 
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RULE 15 
AMENDED AND SUPPLEMENTAL PLEADINGS 
(b) AMENDMENTS TO CONFORM TO THE 
EVIDENCE. When issues not raised by the pleadings 
are tried by express or implied consent of the parties, 
they shall be treated in all respects as if they had been 
raised in the pleadings. Such amendment of the pleading 
as may be necessary to cause them to conform to the 
evidence and to raise these issues may be made upon 
motion of any party at any time, even after judgment; 
but failure so to amend does not affect the result of 
the trial of these issues. If evidence is objected to at 
the trial on the ground that it is not within the issues 
made by the pleadings, the court may allow the plead-
ings to be amended when the presentation of the merits 
of the action will be subserved thereby and the objecting 
party fails to satisfy the court that the admission of 
such evidence would prejudice him in maintaining his 
action or defense upon the merits. The court shall grant 
a continuance, if necessary, to enable the objecting 
party to meet such evidence. 
(d) SUPPLEMENTAL PLEADINGS. Upon mo-
tion of a party the court may, upon reasonable notice 
and upon such terms as are just, permit him to serve 
a supplemental pleading setting forth transactions or 
occurrences or events which have happened since the 
date of the pleading sought to be supplemented. If the 
court deems it advisable that the adverse party plead 
thereto, it shall so order, specifying the time therefor." 
Defendant wishes to point out to the court, and the tran-
script of the testimony at the trial (containing only evidence 
elicited from defendant when called as a witness by counsel 
for plaintiff) so indicates, that the Amended and Supplemental 
Complaint did not relate to any "issue not raised by the plead-
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ings which was tried by express or implied consent of th1 
parties ... " In fact, the Nevada decree of divorce was no 
even offered in evidence at the trial but was only incorporatec 
in the pleadings on behalf of the parties for limited purposes 
Specifically, plaintiff took the position that the Nevada decret 
was not binding on the right of child support. This statement 
can be found in paragraph 5 of plaintiff's original Complaint 
(R. 2): 
" ... There was no final adjudication as to the ... 
right of this plaintiff . . . to receive support money 
for the support of her minor child." 
In this defendant's Amended Answer, he answered and 
agreed to plaintiff's contention concerning child support, as 
follows (R. 22) : 
"Defendant admits that said adjudication was not 
binding on the right of plaintiff to receive support 
money for the support of the minor child of the parties." 
From the pleadings and from the evidence introduced at 
the trial, there was no issue before the court concerning the 
effect of the Nevada decree on the :ight of plaintiff to secure 
child support. From the clear-cut allegations of the pleadings 
and evidence, it can hardly be seen how the amended com· 
plaint related to " . . . issues not raised by the pleadings" 
which were " . . . tried by express or implied consent of the 
parties." Furthermore, the rule is mandatory that the amend-
ments must "conform to the evidence ... " Defendant submits 
that there is not a scintilla of evidence on plaintiff's behalf 
which will supply any single ingredient necessary to grantinB 
28 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
permission to file an Amended and Supplemental Complaint. 
All of plaintiff's evidence was precisely to the contrary. 
In the case of Apex Smelting Co. z·s. Burns, C. A. Illinois, 
1949, 179 Fed. 2d 978, interpreting Federal Rule 15, it was 
stated: 
"Here, for the first time plaintiff advances the theory 
that defendants were liable on breach of contract ... " 
Quoting from 79 F. Supp. 654, 658: 
"The effect of the amendment they propose would 
be not to conform the pleadings to a judgment they 
had won, but to jeopardize and perhaps to overthrow 
a judgment they had lost. If this latter application of the 
rule were permitted, a losing party, by motions to 
amend and rehear, could keep a case in court indefi-
nitely, trying one theory of recovery or defense after 
another, in the hope of finally hitting upon a successful 
one." 
Also, U.S. vs. Southern Pacific Co. (Oregon), 75 F. Supp. 
336 at 339, states: 
"A new and distinct lawsuit should never be injected 
into a case by filing a supplemental pleading. This 
rule is inherent in all systems of pleading, common law, 
code or federal. It is required by the necessities. Con-
fusion would otherwise result." 
Another matter was brought up after trial which did not 
conform to the pleadings or any evidence introduced at the 
trial. Counsel for plaintiff in the Amended and Supplemental 
Complaint asked for counsel fees in the sum of $300.00. No 
plea for counsel fees (other than for temporary fees) was raised 
in the original Complaint or Reply, nor was any mention of 
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the same included in the evidence introduced at the trial. Thf 
request for this relief was apparently an afterthought on th( 
part of counsel . to secure something which was not asked fot 
at the proper time. The court allowed counsel the sum of 
$200.00 as attorney's fees, apparently based upon securing 
child support under the Nevada decree. In this connection, 
after trial, when plaintiff's counsel asked for judgment on 
the pleadings (the Amended and Supplemental Complaint 
and the Answer thereto) he admitted on cross-examination that 
despite the fact that he put forth legal services in the original 
action (in which plaintiff failed to prevail) in the sum of 
about $1,250.00 to $1,500.00 (R. 93), he merely made an 
appearance in court asking for judgment on the amended and 
supplemental pleadings, and drew up a short Amended and 
Supplemental Complaint. For these services plaintiff was 
granted judgment for $200.00. It appears that the court 
was, in effect, basing the allowance of counsel fees upon an 
abortive effort to show the invalidi~ of the Nevada decree. 
Since the allegation requesting attorney's fees was the 
only "supplemental" portion of the Amended and Supplemental 
Complaint, we are faced with the rule announced in the case of 
Randolph vs. Missouri R. Co. et al1 78 F. Supp. 727 at 729: 
"A supplemental petition, of course, must be based 
upon t~ings that have occurred since the filing of the 
original complaint and must be based upon the same 
cause of action as the original complaint." 
Since the Third District Court had no jurisdiction to enter· 
tain the original causes of action set forth in plaintiffs original 
Complaint and her Reply, the Amended and Supplemental 
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Complaint permitted by Judge Van Cott after trial cannot cure 
the jurisdictional defect. For that reason, on jurisdictional 
grounds alone, the final judgment is null and void. 
When plaintiff tried to assert a new cause of action after 
trial in her Amended and Supplemental Complaint based upon 
the decree of the State of Nevada, the applicable portion of 
which she had previously steadfastly maintained to be invalid, 
it is very clear that a new and distinct law:suit was injected 
into the action upon a point which was moot and made res 
judicata by prior pleadings of the parties. 
Fairbanks, Morse & Co. vs. Consolidated Fisheries Co. 
(Delaware) 94 F. Supp. 311 at 320: 
" . . . Now, after losing its case, defendant shifts 
its position and proposes amendments alleging an action 
sounding in tort ... The effect of the pro2osed amend-
ments is to reopen the case and relitigate the question 
of defendant's liability . . . The . . . action of a court 
permitting such amendments is based on the court's 
discretion and this cannot be an unbridled discretion." 
Quoting (see R. 92 and 93) from the case of New York 
Central & H.R.R.Co. vs. Kinney, 260 U. S. 340, 346, 43 S. Ct. 
122, 123, that court stated: 
"The first special defense is that the amended com-
plaint set forth new and distinct causes of action, which 
were not contained in the original complaint and were 
not brought within the time limited by law ... I think 
the defense is good." 
Concerning the power of a court to permit an amendment 
in the manner sought in this action, the Utah case of Com-
bined Metals, Inc. vs. Bastian (supra) also clearly set forth 
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the proposition advanced by this defendant at 71 Utah, page 
554: 
" ... a cause of action alleged in an amende~ ~eti­
tion, though founded on the same grievance o~ lnJury 
as that described in the original, is a different cause of 
action, if it is dependent upon different grounds for 
holding the defendant responsible for the wrong al-
leged; and that the power of a court to permit an 
amendment of a pleading does not authorize an im-
portation which in effect introduces a new or different 
cause of action." 
Since the portion of the Nevada decree relating to child 
support was admittedly invalid according to the allegations of 
both parties in the pleadings in this case, this matter became 
res judicata and was improperly brought forth by an amend-
ment to plaintiffs complaint. Although this defendant set 
up the bulk of the Nevada decree as a bar to plaintiff's 
action, and in so doing set forth the provisions of the decree 
for that purpose, the plaintiff cannot now claim that other 
parts of the decree should now constitute a new cause of action. 
In the case of Simms vs. Andrews, C. C. A. Oklahoma} 
1941, 118 Fed. 2d 803, it was held that an amendment to the 
pleadings to conform to proof is not authorized merely because 
evidence, which is competent and material upon issues created 
by the pleadings, incidentally tends to prove another fact not 
within the issues in the case. Furthermore, in the case of Town 
of Texhoma vs. Neild, 9 F.R.D. 739 at 741, the court made 
the following observation: 
"The matters set up in the supplemental pleading 
are matters that could have been set up in the original 
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complaint and litigated in the hearing that resulted in 
a judgment for the plaintiff. Under all the authorities 
such matters thus sought to be litigated in the supple-
mental pleading are now res judicata." 
Quoting from the foregoing case of Simms vs. Andrews, 
which is a case from our own Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals, 
we find this statement at page 807: 
"The right to amend pleadings to conform to the 
proof proceeds upon the theory that by such amendment 
the pleadings are brought in line with the actual issues 
upon which the case was tried ... 
Also, U. S. vs. Brookhaven, 134 Fed. 2d 442 at 446: 
" . . . The provision of Rules of Civil Procedure 
15 (b), 28 U.S.C.A .... looks to supporting the judg-
ment by amendments, or to making the record show 
more perfectly what was tried and decided. It does 
not authorize an amendment to nullify the judgment 
and begin a new contest." 
In the case of Sears Roebuck & Co. vs. Marhenke, C. C. A. 
California, 1941, 121 Fed. 2d 598, it was held that Rule 15 (b) 
applies only in a case in which issues not raised by the plead-
ings were tried by express or implied consent of the parties. 
The federal case of Popovitch vs. Kasperlik ( 1947), 76 
F. Supp. 223 at 239, clearly indicates the tests to be applied 
Rule 15 (b) before allowing an amendment: 
"The tests to be applied when the question arises 
whether an amended complaint should be filed are--
would a judgment bar any further action on either, 
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does the same measure of damages support both, is the 
same defense open in each, and is the same measure 
of proof required." 
Now, if we apply the tests set forth in the Popovich case 
to the Amended and Supplemental Complaint in the case be-
fore this Court, we can see that the Amended and Supplemental 
Complaint fell far short of meeting those tests: 
First: The measure of damages allowed under the first 
judgment (Order) (R. 41) following the trial of the matter, 
and under the theory upon which the case was tried, did not 
provide any back amounts to be recovered by the plaintiff. On 
the other hand, plaintiff was allowed to recover judgment for 
$1435.00 back support under the Amended and Supplemental 
Complaint. 
Second: The same defense is not open to each action. In 
the action, as tried, the defense to the pleading and proof was 
that the Nevada decree was subsisting and valid except as to 
the award for child support. However, when the entire Nevada 
decree was introduced as the basis of a new cause of action, 
the defense as to the child support provision had to be other 
than the existence of the decree itself. 
Third: It is quite obvious that the same measure of proof 
is much different under the theory of the Amended and Sup· 
plemental Complaint than it was under the theory that the 
Nevada decree was invalid. Under the latter theory the intro· 
duction of the decree standing alone, in the absence of an 
affirmative defense, constituted the only proof needed as to 
make it the de~ree of the Utah court. However, at the trial, 
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all of the proof and evidence was directed to setting aside 
and nullifying that very decree. 
(III) 
Even if the court had jurisdiction and if it properly allowed 
the filing of the amended and supplemental pleadings, it 
erred in granting judgment on the amended and supplemental 
pleadings. 
After plaintiff was permitted to file the Amended and Sup-
plemental Complaint, this defendant answered the same and, 
as a first defense, raised the objections previously referred to 
under Rule 15 (b) and (d) and also objected to the allowance 
of any attorney's fee. As a second defense, this defendant 
alleged that the evidence introduced and admitted at the trial 
proved that an agreement existed by and between the parties 
whereby the plaintiff agreed to support the minor child, and 
that plaintiff should not be allowed to recover any alleged 
amounts of money based upon the Nevada decree of divorce, 
or otherwise, for any period of time up to the time of the filing 
of plaintiff's amended and supplemental complaint. 
As a third defense, this defendant raised the issue--made 
moot by the prior pleadings-that the court of the State of 
Nevada did not have the jurisdiction over the person of the 
minor child for the reason that it was not before the court 
and that the provision respecting the child was inserted by 
the Nevada court upon the court's own initiative and without 
any consent of this defendant. 
Suffice it to say, in addition to the arguments previously set 
forth relating to this issue, that the Restatement of Conflict 
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of Laws has covered this point, indicating that the child must 
have been domiciled in Nevada: 
"54. Status. 
( 1) A state which creates any status oth.er than a 
domestic status has jurisdiction over 1t. 
( 2) A state has jurisdiction over the domestic status 
of persons domiciled within the state." 
''Comments: 
c. "Domestic status" is the status of husband and 
wife, or of a child and a parent or guardian." 
As a fourth defense to the Amended and Supplemental 
Complaint, this defendant denied the allegation as to whether 
the minor child is now self -supporting or has need of support. 
In fact, the defendant does not actually know whether or not 
the child is now alive and in existence or whether the mother 
is remarried. For all he knows, the child could be deceased and 
the mother could be simply attempting to secure money on a 
pretense. Furthermore, it does not appear that the plaintiff 
has affixed her name to any paper or pleading found in the 
record; and she certainly never appeared to give any evidence, 
either in person or in any other manner. Based upon a total 
dearth of evidence and a clear-cut denial in the Answer to 
the Amended and Supplemental Complaint (R. 51), upon 
what theory can the Court's fourth finding of fact (the last 
line thereof) (R. 99), and which is not even included in 
the Conclusions of Law, be justified? 
It should be noted that despite the fact that plaintiff knew 
of this defendant's whereabouts for over 2'l2 years following 
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the Nevada decree, no demand for alimony or support or 
maintenance was ever made. This was consistent with defend-
ant's understanding of the agreement existing between the 
parties. Despite such fact, this defendant is again pointing out 
that the minor child should not be barred from recovering 
against either of its parents for support simply because the 
parents entered into an agreement concerning the keeping 
and custody of the child. However, as between the parents, 
such an agreement is binding-at least as to past amounts of 
support allegedly expended by either parent. Evidence con-
cerning such an agreement was brought forth at the hearing 
on the matter by this defendant, the only person to testify on 
either side. 
See Krotsky vs. Krotsky (1915) 169 App. Div. 850, 155 
N. Y.S. 625 and Pierce vs. Pierce ( 1911) 71 N. Y. 154, 117 
A.L.R. 1184, as stating the rule that conduct similar to that 
in the case at bar; i.e., the lapse of time and an express or 
implied agreement, constituted a waiver of her right to recover 
past amounts expended for the support of herself and the 
minor children. 
In allowing amendments the court should never permit 
the same to work an in justice on either party. In the case of 
Hirschhorn vs. Mine Safety Appliances Co. ( 1951 101 F. Supp. 
549 at 552, which involved an amendment before trial, it was 
stated: 
"The primary question is whether or not the amend-
ment will work injustice on any of the parties." 
Under the circumstances of this case, it seems manifestly 
unfair to permit plaintiff to amend her complaint after trial 
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and allow her to recover on the very decree she sought to have 
set aside. This becomes all the more unfair when we examine 
the statement of plaintiff's counsel (R. 93) concerning the 
amount of work and the reasonable value, if not more so, than 
plaintiff's attorney, since this defendant was on the defensive 
throughout the action? 
The uncontradicted evidence brought out the existence 
of an agreement between the parties relating to child support 
and custody. This was permitted to stand by Judge Baker as 
a defense to the claim to past support money claimed to be 
due (R. 27). Furthermore, at the trial, Judge VanCott also rec-
ognized the defense as valid (R. 74): 
MR. ARNOVITZ: Now at this time we would like 
to strike all evidence with respect to any agreement 
that was made with the mother for her own support and 
the support of the child for the reason and on the 
grounds that such an agreement would be contrary to 
public policy. 
MR. FULLER: In that connection we agree it is 
contrary to public policy insofar as the child is con-
cerned, but not insofar as the action brought by the 
wife against this defendant for past amounts due. 
THE COURT: Well, I would think that is correct, 
Mr. Arnovitz, isn't it? It may be against public policy 
so far as the child is concerned and it wouldn't be bind-
ing, but as to herself she could make such an agreement. 
From the foregoing statement, it clearly appears that 
Judge Van Cott abused his discretion in allowing plaintiff to 
recover back support money on a different theory-and one 
which was made moot by all prior pleadings-for back support 
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money which he himself recognized could not be recovered 
under the theory of the case, as tried, by reason of the existence 
of an agreement which was not controverted by any evidence 
submitted by plaintiff. 
CONCLUSION 
It is anticipated that counsel for plaintiff will attempt 
to influence the court with the argument that the minor child 
of the parties is willfully being neglected by its father. Such 
is not the case. This defendant is willing, and has offered, to 
assist in the support of the child despite the contention that 
an agreement between the defendant and plaintiff heretofore 
existed to the effect that she did not wish him to do so. 
This defendant has been involved in continuous and 
harassing litigation for more than one year. He submits that 
if the minor child of these parties is actually in need of 
support, he will be amenable to furnishing such support, but 
absolutely will not pay any money directly to the plaintiff 
for amounts which she claims are due to her for past support 
furnished to the minor child. Defendant submits that the child 
will possibly never see such payments, that the child has actually 
been supported by its maternal grandparents who are people 
of fairly substantial means, and that the mother will merely 
spend the money for her own pleasure. 
There are procedures whereby this defendant can be ac-
corded his full and complete rights under the law and whereby 
the minor child can secure needed support and maintenance 
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from its father. As indicated in the first Dimon vs. Dimot 
case ( 244 Pac. 2d at page 976-7), in a state such as Utah 
which does not have a specific statute allowing a parent to 
bring an action against the other parent for child support jn 
the absence of an actual divorce proceeding, the child's right 
to support (which existed at common law and which still 
exists) is transitory and will follow the father wherever he 
may be. However, in the absence of such statutory provision, 
the mother can only bring the action as guardian ad litem for 
the child. Under such circumstances, the court can provide 
sufficient safeguards to see that the monies paid are actually 
expended on behalf of the child. 
Another and better remedy which is available to plaintiff 
-and which should be used if she does not seek to personally 
come before the Utah courts-is that of the Uniform Recip-
rocal Enforcement of Support Act. This remedy was also 
pointed out in the first Dimon vs. Dimon case. Had plaintiff 
followed this procedure and filed a petition in the proper court 
of New York, she could have secured support for the child 
many months ago and this defendant (and the Utah courts) 
would have been fully informed as to all aspects of the case 
and the needs of the child. 
The Uniform Reciprocal Enforcement of Support Act 
was created out of the necessity for providing a means of secur· 
ing support in just such a situation as this. The defendant will 
necessarily have to submit to such an action if it is brought, but 
he will at least have the knowledge that the child will be be· 
fore the court in New York, and he and the proper courts will 
have an opportunity to ascertain the needs of the child. 
40 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
This court may find that the jurisdictional argument set 
forth in this brief has never been raised before by any other 
member of the bar. However, merely because the point is 
raised for the first time on appeal, that fact alone should be 
no reason for disregarding the argument herein contained. The 
writer has made a very thorough and systematic study of the 
subject of jurisdiction and the divorce statutes of various states 
in arriving at the conclusions herein reached. 
Counsel for this defendant wishes to anticipate part of 
the defense which plaintiff may raise in her brief. In this con-
nection, the following points are pertinent: 
( 1) Some cases might be cited with dicta apparently contra 
to those herein included relating to the allowance of alimony, 
but most relate to an allowance of alimony in an "independent" 
action before a divorce is secured. 
(2) Each and every case cited wherein alimony has been 
allowed after divorce should be carefully checked against the 
statutes of the respective states. 
( 3) All cases cited, whether federal or otherwise, in-
volving an interpretation of Rule 15(b) and (d) should be 
carefully checked to make sure that the cases do not involve 
amendments before trial and judgment, since such situations 
are subject to more relaxed principles. 
It is submitted that the plaintiff has pursued an incorrect 
procedure from the very commencement of her action. In view 
of the arguments and the foregoing, it is submitted that the 
judgment entered by Judge Ray Van Cott on May 7, 1953·, 
should be set aside as null and void, and that plaintiff be re-
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quired to proceed as guardian ad litem in a transitory action 
or under the Uniform Reciprocal Enforcement of Support Act, 
or by such other remedies as are available, so that this defendant 
may have the opportunity of fully knowing what is expected 
and demanded of him as to the future support of his minor 
child and, at the same time, be assured that the child per-
sonally receives the benefits of such future payments. 
Respectfully submitted, 
GLEN E. FULLER 
Attorney for Defendant-Appellant 
705-7 First Security Bank Bldg. 
Salt Lake City, Utah 
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